Depicting a good polity, one that is morally superior and desired, is relatively easy. Utopian writers have drawn various designs for centuries. Some prefer direct democracies to representative ones; some see much merit in local government; others extol the merits of world government. There is surely much merit to this visionary approach, if only because it allows one to clarify the values to which we adhere, as they are projected or "revealed" in these utopian designs. This article focuses on the more difficult question of how one can get from here to there, on the ways a polity may restructure itself to reflect more closely the preferred system. The result, it turns out, is not neutral in terms of various utopian pictures: The good polity turns out to be one in which the government is responsive to all the needs of all the members of the community. At the same time, we recognize the factors that limit our ability to move toward a good polity, the constraints on design. At issue are questions surrounding the capacities of a polity to know itself and its environment, how decisions are made, the relative power of the government versus those who are governed-and not only questions of effective representation but of institutionalized opportunities to change those in power and other such more often studied factors.
tional design dominated by historical or evolutionary forces such as changing resource and cultural endowments? (From a discussion outline at a conference on institutional design organized by John P. Campbell and others in 1987) The answer, as we see it, lies between two poles. On one end is the voluntaristic pole which assumes a very malleable social system. On the other end is the determinist pole which assumes little or no ability to guide. The productive question is, what conditions enhance the possibility of guiding the polity?
After implicitly ignoring or explicitly challenging the need to study social and political institutions (North, 1987, p. 2) , select followers of the neoclassical paradigm are turning to study it in their own way. They treat institutions as designed and fashioned at will by free-standing, rational individuals seeking to maximize their utilities. For example, hierarchical institutions such as corporations are said to be introduced, when they are needed, because "decentralized" markets are found to be inefficient when the volume of transactions and knowledge needed to coordinate it are high (Heiner, 1983; Williamson, 1975) . Subscribers to the paradigm treat other sociohistorical factors in the same manner: value systems (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977) , norms (Field, 1984) , rules (Baumol & Quandt, 1964; Frank, 1987) , societal structures, and even the unfolding of history itself (e.g., North, 1981) .
The philosophical roots of this approach are Lockean. The image that permeates these writings is of a state of nature that preceded society and its institutions, a state in which individuals joined to form commons out of rational deliberations and in line with their interests. Locke and others who drew on this image realized quite well that history did not evolve in this way. They used the image for purely heuristic purposes. It might, hence, be quite unnecessary to argue that historically the commons preceded individuals and to a large extent fashioned them. The pivotal question, though, remains: What is the validity of this paradigm, which the heuristic devices serve to chart?
The neoclassical paradigm of design, broadly understood, may well be partially valid. Its deepest problems arise not from the factors it encompasses but from those it does not embrace. The resulting partial view, the highly voluntarist, individualist, and rationalist perspective, ignores deterministic, collective, and nonrational factors, that, together with those which the neoclassical paradigm does encompass, may account for much of the dynamics of institutions, polity, society, and history.
In effect, whether one takes the viewpoint of a single individual or a collective actor, such as the White House, a legislature, or other such organs, the lone actor faces major roadblocks. The nondesignable factors, including historical forces, environmental factors, and other actors, are not necessarily cooperative. Legal experts may fashion contracts, laws, or international treaties, but societal forces bend them in ways difficult to anticipate and impossible to prevent. Victorious social movements, such as the Communists of 1917 in the USSR, may seek to design a society without religion, family, hierarchy, coercion, or stratification. But in the process, they may, without so intending, advance a society with strong and growing elements of the kind they sought to undo.
There is no reason, however, to embrace the opposite extreme, the neoromantic paradigm, which views society and history as governed by forces we are unable to comprehend or control (Shweder, 1986) . It seems more productive to presuppose a perpetual, in part creative, conflict between the forces carving a new design and those who are either inert or oppose the emerging direction. A more accurate view sees polities and social systems in general as guided in part by a cybernetic overlay and in part by an underlay composed of collective bodies tied by societal bonds, values, institutions, and powers that may resist guidance from above. Once the key elements of both parts are specified, we are ready to ask the pivotal question that those who seek to design must face: Under what conditions are the guiding factors relatively more powerful? What renders a polity relatively more malleable?
A brief terminological digression is necessary here. The use of the term "design" provides an image we suggest one ought to avoid. It is an image of a world that is a tabula rasa, like the paper on which an architect draws his or her design, a subject without "designs" or attributes of its own, without the power to resist being sketched upon. The term "control" has similar, though less extreme, voluntaristic and omnipotent implications. We prefer to use the term "guidance" to stress that whatever the designers indicate, it is but one source of the resulting dynamic; the end product reflects a combination of "downward" control efforts (from elites to the public) and "upward" flow of societal consensus (from the public to the elites), which both sustain and limit the control.
THE KEY ELEMENTS
The concept that societies (and subsocieties, such as communities, races, and ethnic groups) are endowed with cybernetic capacities is highlighted by the fact that these groups use various organizations to set goals, form policies, and guide social processes, including changes in their own structures, even in their guiding mechanisms. Governments, professional and voluntary associations, lobby groups, and corporate hierarchies are all cases in point. The processes of such social organizations are akin to deliberate individual decision making in that they use knowledge, draw on inferences, and so on.
These organizations provide the cybernetic overlay of society and other social collectives. They typically contain cybernetic "heads" that generate policies which are, in turn, transmitted to their "bodies" for implementation. The "bodies" typically consist of so-called bureaucracies or organizational structures, which, at the direction of the "heads," seek to introduce the decisions made into the societies and other social collectives.
The main structures of implementation are hierarchies (whether these are public agencies, private corporations, or voluntary associations), regulation, and other forms of intervention in the market and society (e.g., subsidies). While these structures draw on persuasion and information, power often plays a key role. For example, a government agency that seeks to curb drunken driving uses not only dissemination of public service announcements and driver education to call attention to the dangers of driving while intoxicated but fines and incarcerates violators. The need to apply power to enhance the introduction of a policy is an indication of resisting factors that must be overcome if they cannot be won over, so that implementation may take place.
The collective social bodies, into which the guiding signals and forces are injected, are typically organized groups, not atomized individuals. These groupings include local communities, ethnic groups, neighborhoods, and other such social bodies, the members of which are bound to one another by social bonds and value commitments. They often have guidance mechanisms of their own, such as labor unions, which often act as constraints rather than serve as resources for guidance from the viewpoint of the actor under study, because these "other" actors tend to follow their own course.
Only highly voluntaristic theory assumes that it is enough to fashion a plan, or to emit a signal, and it will implement itself; that is, it will not require specialized implementation efforts, investments, and structures. It may seem unrealistic in the extreme to make such assumptions, but much of economic theory used to assume, as significant segments still do, that information travels at the speed of lig~t, is instantly absorbed, and moves without cost (Thurow, 1983) . In contrast, it is assumed here that there are no transactions among equals, that is, all transactions are affected by power differentials (Etzioni, 1988) , and at least a marginal power advantage is a necessaryprerequisite of implementation. A list of propositions follows, including the factors that are expected to increase the ability of both the overlay and the underlay to guide and thereasons for this expectation.
Effectiveness of the Cybernetic Head 1. Knowledge: A working hypothesis. Societal units differ in their capacity to collect, process, and use information. This holds not only for corporations that compete over a market but for other units, such as political parties (e.g., Kennedy is believed to have used social science more effectively in the 1960 campaign), federal agencies (e.g., the Air Force is thought by some to be more effective in these matters than the Navy and the Army), and civic organizations, such as Common Cause. We suggest that the input of knowledge into a societal unit follows the same basic pattern of other inputs; that is, it might be blocked and hence partially or completely lost for practical purposes at each stage of the process. Societal units have varying capabilities for collecting information. This capacity seems to be associated with economic affluence but not in a one-to-one relationship. If we were to rank countries (or other societal units) by their per capita income and then score their capacities to collect information, say, in terms of expenditures on research, we would expect the most affluent units to have higher capacities than the next most affluent ones, and the units at the bottom of the scale would have few such capacities.
2. Information: Collection and processing. The ratio of investment in collecting over processing information is an indicator of the sophistication of the cybernetic overlay and the knowledge-strategy to which the particular unit subscribes. The United States and Great Britain tend to invest relatively highly in data collection; France, at least until recently, has stressed relatively more processing (Shonfield, 1965) . A societal unit that emphasizes disproportionately the collection of information will have a fragmented view of itself and its environment; it will have many bits but no picture, like a public opinion survey before tabulation. Information which is collected but not sufficiently processed tends to cause society to drift about or react passively instead of actively guiding itself.
On the other hand, a unit that overemphasizes processing is expected to have an unempirical view of itself and its environment because it will tend to draw more conclusions from the available information than are warranted; it is similar to acting on the basis of a poorly validated theory. Thus overprocessing is expected to be associated with hyperactivity, as the actors assume they know more than they do. This is the case when master planning is used to guide economic development. Finally, societal units whose collection and processing are relatively balanced (not in absolute amounts but in terms of the intrinsic needs of their guidance mechanisms) are expected, all other things being equal, to have comparatively more effective controlling overlayers and to be active without being hyperactive.
Full and well-processed information might still be wasted if it is not systematically introduced into the unit's decision-making and implementation overlayer where most consumption of information takes place. 1\110 major variables seem useful for characterizing the different arrangements that societal units have for interaction between the knowledge-producing and the decision-making units; one concerns the relative degree of autonomy of production, the other, the effectiveness of the communication of the product. It is widely believed that structural differentiation between the producers and consumers of information is necessary. Fusion of the two kinds of units, for instance, in the management of a corporation, is dysfunctional both for production of knowledge and for decision making. For societal units whose knowledge and decision-making units are differentiated, various modes and forms of articulation and communication exist whose relative effectiveness remains to be explored. Here, we can touch on only one aspect of this intricate subject.
The controlling overlay is itself made of various layers, one on top of another. Processing is superimposed on the collecting of information, both in the logical sense that the one presupposes the other and in the structural sense that those engaged in the processing tend to be of higher rank and have more power to mold the input of knowledge than those who collect information.
Consumption and, to a degree, processing of knowledge are inevitably political processes. That is, the parts of the available knowledge used and the conclusions reached on the basis of that knowledge are, in part, determined by political factors. These factors include the internal politics of the organizations to which knowledge producers belong, their affiliations with political groupings in the society at large, and the varying absorption, according to its political rather than intrinsic value, of the knowledge produced. The core of making knowledge political often lies not in deliberate or subconscious slanting of facts but in the interpretive and judgmental elements that most knowledge processing includes. It is not, as some students of administration would have it, that knowledge units produce information and the political decision-making elites add the judgment. The producers of knowledge themselves play an active role in formulating the judgments. All these issues were highlighted during the CBS-Westmoreland trial which dealt with the information about the war in Vietnam that the military provided to the White House, Congress, and the public.
Within this context, one issue is of special significance for the study of societal guidance: the effect of the relative investments in two sections of the cybernetic overlay, namely, transforming knowledge versus stable knowl-edge. Transforming knowledge rechecks and potentially challenges the basic assumptions of a system. Stable knowledge elaborates and respecifies, even revises secondary assumptions, but leaves the core assumptions untouched. Decision-making elites tend to prefer the production of stable over transforming knowledge. They tend to seek affirmation of their basic assumptions precisely because these assumptions cannot be selected and reviewed on wholly empirical grounds. Hence once consensus has been reached on a basic worldview, a self-view, a view of others, or strategic doctrine, it is politically, economically, and psychologically expensive for the elites to transform these assumptions (Janis, 1972) . Therefore, they tend to become tabooed assumptions, limiting the production of knowledge to specifics within the confines of these assumptions. This method sharply reduces the ability to transform basic perspectives, and with it drops the capacity for societal self-transformation.
Highly active societal units have supralayers that can be activated to review and transform tabooed assumptions. A corporation that shifted to a new line of products, restructured its internal organization, and found new markets when it gradually lost its old market compared to a corporation whose sales and profits continuously eroded because of lack of innovation suggests that transforming corporations maintain units which are not only exempt from the taboo on the assumptions but are, among other things, expected to sporadically review these assumptions. That is, part of their institutionalized role was to engage in search behavior precisely where the decision-making elites would otherwise settle for "satisfying" solutions.
The societal equivalent of this cybernetic arrangement is not difficult to see. The intellectual community acts as a series of societal knowledge units, as critical examiners of tabooed assumptions. Under what economic, political, and sociological conditions it can fulfill this function and what, if any, functional alternatives exist is a matter on which there is surprisingly little systematic research (Coser, 1965) .
At first blush, it would seem obvious that the more knowledge an actor commands, the more the actor is able to guide a social system. Thus an Agency for International Development project conceived by experts is expected to be much more effective than one conceived by amateurs. It is also expected that experts are more able to design a program to solve a problem about which much is known, such as traffic congestion, than one about which little is known, such as mental illness. On closer examination, however, this question of how much knowledge the societal guide commands turns out to be a rather complex matter and not merely a question of the amount of knowledge. One complexity emerges out of the tension between specialization and comprehensiveness. Expert, or advanced, knowledge tends to be specialized. Social systems, however, are multifaceted; as a rule it is not possible to significantly modify one element without either modifying or dealing with the others (Etzioni, 1985) . Otherwise, the untreated elements become the source of "irrational" or "unanticipated" reactions. If, for example, one introduces an austerity program into a less developed country (LDC) in order to curb inflation without paying attention to the political consequences, the result of this attempt to improve the economy may be a military dictatorship. On another front, the result of more effective border patrols and interceptions of drug shipments may be urban crime waves, as the price of drugs rises as supplies shrink.
Effective guidance, it seems, requires both "expert" (valid, well-formulated, advanced), typically specialized knowledge, and encompassing knowledge that covers the relevant variables, something training in "policy sciences" and experience are more likely to provide than highly specialized training (for a discussion of the difficulties entailed in combining specialized knowledge to make encompassing knowledge and the ways to proceed, see Etzioni, 1985) .
Furthermore, the question "Which knowledge is 'valid'?" is far from simple. Knowledge is often produced within analytic frameworks that define the criteria of validation. For instance, "findings" by neoclassical economists often reflect a combination of assumptions and weighted regression analyses, which are "validated" by dove-tailing the conclusions of one analysis with those of similarly composed other. These conclusions do not necessarily serve as a reliable basis for intervening in the economy. Thus programs formulated by neoclassical experts in attempts to enhance saving by providing tax incentives via All-Savers certificates, and more recently via IRAs, generated little net gain in savings.
In short, while knowledge may well be the most "rational" component of the cybernetic overlay, it contains major difficulties, which, if not insurmountable, render guidance a far from straightforward or "rational" endeavor. Rather, guidance requires at least some trial and error, adjusting the course as factors not understood come into play, not a reliance on the course indicated by the original analysis. That is, if one could understand fully a situation and the consequences of one's interventions in that situation, one could plan, in detail, what must be done to engineer a desired change. Or, if one knew nothing, one could seek random interventions. However, the fact that knowledge is often partial (not to be confused with "imperfect" knowledge) suggests that the preliminary formulations of a policy are to be followed by focused trial and error within a range defined by the knowledge one already has, not a random search; this, in turn, will lead to frequent revisions of one's policy. That is, policies ought to be treated as little more than working hypotheses in which one has limited confidence. This may seem "obvious," but it is a point frequently ignored by many policy advocates, planners, and active citizens. Indeed, liberals in the 1960s focused on passing legislation rather than on how and if it was implemented, one of the failings of the New Frontier and the Great Society.
3. "Appropriate" decision-making strategy: The ability of actors to guide is affected by their choice of decision-making strategies. There are no universally appropriate strategies; they must be suited to the given level of knowledge and the task. Thus, although decision-making strategies that scan widely and deeply (i.e., examine a wide range of options, each in detail) may seem superior in the abstract to those that scan less, this is often not the case: for instance, when knowledge is costly. Frank (1987) recently called attention to the advantages of "searching" less, even adopting what othelWise may seem to be quite unsatisfactory solutions, when search costs are high.
Another factor to be considered is the complexity of the task. Very simple tasks allow for highly rationalistic decision making (one may be able to find the perfect solution), although even for a game of checkers this is rather daunting. Complex tasks, which all societal tasks are, require much less exacting decision-making strategies. For example, mixed scanning rather than full scanning decision makers first examine major sectors in a generalized way, choose which sectors to examine in detail, and explore more fully only those options that fall into the chosen sections. While such strategies will yield nonoptimal choices, they are much less taxing than full scanning (Etzioni,1986) .
The Role of Power
The basic neoclassical paradigm has no place for the concept of power. This point is usually expressed by saying that no firm has the ability to affect the market. As Stigler (1968) put it, "The essence of perfect competition, therefore, is the utter dispersion of power" (p. 181). He added that in this way, power is "annihilated. ..just as a gallon of water is effectively annihilated if it is spread over a thousand acres" (p. 181).1 Nor do other voluntarist, rationalist paradigms have a concept of power. In effect, even a cursory examination of incidents of guidance show that aside from the wisdom of the decisions made, students of guidance and its architects must learn the extent to which decisions are reinforced by power. Power is defmed as the ability of A to make B follow A's instructions. In this context, cybernetic power refers to the relative strength of the overlay over the underlay, such as management versus workers or labor unions or the government versus those governed.
A central predisposition of societal guidance is that the relationship between assets and power is a loose one -that is, the amount of assets a societal unit commands is a poor predictor of how much power the unit has. The amount of power generated depends significantly on the allocation of a unit's assets among alternative usages. A unit poor in assets can, in principle, command more power than a much more affluent one if the poor unit assigns more of its assets to generate power. With half of the GNP the Soviet Union long maintained a defense budget similar to that of the United States.
What fraction of the assets that a unit converts into power is itself influenced by the societal context and not freely set by the societal actor. For example, the fact that Black Americans were less politically active than Jewish Americans up to the 1960s was partly due to differences in educational opportunities. However, we suggest, the degree of intraunit assignment of assets to power is a relatively more malleable attribute than the amount of assets that the unit possesses at any given point in time. It is here that an important element of voluntarism enters the societal structure. A comparison of colonial societies in the years immediately preceding the takeoff of national independence movements with those immediately after they won their independence suggests that their independence was due more to a shift of assets to generate power and less to an increase in their asset base. Similarly, the American civil rights movement, which between 1953 and 1965 transformed important segments of the American Black community from a passive to an active grouping, entailed much more change in the mobilization of power than in the amount of its assets (Wilson, 1965, pp. 5-7) .
Mobilization
Each societal unit has, at any given point in time, a level of activation which we define as the ratio of its assets that are available for collective action over its total assets. The percentage of the GNP spent by the government, the percentage of the labor force employed by it, and the percentage of knowledge producers that work for it are crude indicators of a national activation level. Mobilization refers to an upward change in the level of activation, to an increase in the fraction of the total assets possessed by a unit that are made available for collective action by that unit.
Most of the time, the level of activation of most societal units is very low. If all their assets are taken into account, usually less than 10% is available for unit action. Hence relatively small percentage changes in the level of mobilization may largely increase the action capacity of a unit. For example, an increase of 10% in the assets of a unit that are mobilized might more than double its action capacity. Major societal transformations, such as revolu-tions and the gaining of national independence, usually involve relatively high mobilization. The secret of the power of social movements lies partly in the relatively high mobilization which their asceticism or intense commitment allows for.
The Cybernetic Underlay
The underlay, the part of the system subject to the overlay and at which its signals and interventions are largely aimed, is the body society or the corporate employees (bound into groups, informal organizations, culture, and associations), depending on which system we study. We already noted that the underlay is quite powerful, very often more so than the overlay. One main reason for this power differential is that the underlay often contains actors having some cybernetic capacities of their own that are largely aimed at the overlay (e.g., workers vs. management), and frequently, the course that these actors seek to follow is not supportive of that of the overlay.
So far, guidance of change has been explored from a downward view, from the controlling overlayer to the controlled underlayer; even the discussion of subject resistance has been from the viewpoint of a controlling center. The main difference, though, between societal and electronic cybernetics is that in society, we take into account systematically that the controlled units have some controlling capacities of their own: They input knowledge, make decisions, pursue goals, and exercise power. Hence the capacity of anyone social unit to act is determined only in part by its ability to control the others; it is similarly affected by the extent of consensus, that is, the extent to which the goals it has chosen to pursue and the means it employs are compatible or in conflict with those preferred by other social units.
Consensus
The congruence of preferences of the units concerned is viewed by typical deterministic theories as largely given, or changing only under the impact of ongoing processes. Voluntaristic theories tend to view it as open to manipulation by charismatic leadership and/or mass media. From the viewpoint of the societal guidance theory evolved here, consensus is the result of a process in which both preferences expressed "upward" (via elections) and "downward" efforts (e.g., government campaigns such as "just say no" to drugs) affect the outcome and change consensus. Many studies have applied such a perspective; in societal guidance theory it finds a theoretical home. How much consensus is actually achieved changes with a variety of sociopolitical factors that cannot be explored here.
As a direct result, the extent to which the total polity is guidable depends highly on two factors. The extent to which the goals of the overlay and of the underlay are compatible, or can be made to be compatible, is the first factor. One way to advance compatibility is for the overlay to mobilize the support of the underlay. Such an endeavor presupposes a highly persuasive overlay, able to gain the voluntary support of the underlay. This kind of mobilization is found when a nation is engaged in what the citizens perceive as a just cause, or in revolutionary movements when a social movement takes over a government, like the Nazis did in Germany in the late 1930s and the Communists did in the USSR in 1917, or in movements of national liberation, as after World War II. However, such a strong ability of the overlay to mobilize the underlay is quite rare. Under most circumstances, the ability even of totalitarian, let alone authoritarian and democratic, governments to mobilize their citizens is quite limited. Governments seek to combat alcoholism and corruption, as has happened recently in the USSR, but such ills remain rampant. The United States seeks to enhance democracy in other countries, as it has recently in Argentina, Haiti, and the Philippines, but they remain highly unstable. The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and local governments seek to curb inflation, but it keeps breaking through, as in Israel. The USSR, even in its more totalitarian days, could not impose its designs much more on Afghanistan than the U.S. could on Vietnam.
A higher degree of compatibility is achieved the other way around, when the overlay is responsive to the inputs of the underlay via well-functioning representative governments. This, in turn, presupposes a high consensus among the various components of the underlay, or in authoritarian countries, a high concentration of power in the underlay, rendering ineffectual those unheeded.
Indeed, a major difference between the concept of "guidability" and those of design and control is that guidability assumes that a significant role is played by the body society in its governance, in setting public policies, and in forming and reforming the structures that influence these policies. It is not a "downward" process, but a combination of "upward" and "downward" flows, with the role of upward signalling an application of power often exceeding that of the downward flow. However, because of internal divisions within both layers (but especially the underlay) and between them, guidance is a complex undertaking, quickly overloaded and often rather slow, costly, cumbersome, and ineffectual.
There is a trade-off curve between control and consensus. That is, for any given level of activation, the greater the consensus, the less need for control. The mix used is, of course, not without consequences; it affects the level of alienation and of resistance and hence the future capacity to guide. It is important to realize that when both consensus and control are relatively high, more change can be guided than when both are lower, without an increase in alienation. (The additional consensus absorbs the additional alienation which the additional control would generate.)
To illustrate a societal guidance approach to the study of consensus formation, we briefly compare segregated consensus formation structures to built-in ones. In a built-in structure, consensus formation is by and large the output of ongoing interactions among the societal units. For example, consensus formation in smaller and less complex preliterate tribes seems to rely largely on ongoing interaction among the member families. In the USSR in 1989, consensus was, to a degree, produced in the process of interaction among factory managers, union leaders, and party officials, although the prime function of these interactions was not consensus formation but economic and administrative (see Berliner, 1957; Brezinski & Huntington, 1965) . In a segregated structure, political units such as parties and legislatures exist as distinct from societal ones, and societal differences are translated into political ones before consensus over collective action is worked out. Segregated structures seem more effective for consensus formation than built-in ones, though they can produce only enough to back up comparatively low levels of activation. They are like sophisticated machines that cannot be used for heavy-duty jobs.
In the search for a polity that would allow for more guided change and higher consensus, a search that is far from completed, voluntary planning has been developed in postwar France and by the European Economic Community. In such planning, there is less segregation of political and societal units than in the segregated structure, typical of traditional democracies, but more segregation than in built-in structures, typical of totalitarian regimes. Above all, the knowledge input units are not related only to the decision-making units but are tied into the consensus-forming process, thus informing the controlled and not just the controlling units and remodeling the judgments that information units produce, on the basis of interaction with both groupings.
IN CONCLUSION
The more we understand the factors that determine the ability to guide, the more we realize that the capacity is typically limited. Far from being highly subject to design, far from being highly malleable, polities (and societies and subsocieties in general) are typically highly resistant to guided change. The extent to which polities are malleable depends to a significant extent not merely or even primarily on the attributes of the controlling parts but on those of the guided units and their relations to the controlling overlay, hence the importance of a conception of the polity that encompasses both kinds of attributes -a "good" polity. NOTE 1. Some neoclassical theories have drawn on the concept of power, including studies of industrial organization, and those of monopolistic behavior. The extent to which these theories are successful and remain within the basic paradigm is a subject not explored here.
